Abstract-We address the problem of attack detection and isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive false data injection attacks. Using a bank of the observers, each observer leading to an Input-to-State Stable (ISS) estimation error, we propose two algorithms for detecting and isolating sensor attacks. These algorithms make use of the ISS property of the observers to check whether the trajectories of observers are "consistent" with the attack-free trajectories of the system. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional control systems composed of interconnected controllers, sensors, and actuators use point-to-point communication architectures. This is no longer suitable when new requirements -such as modularity, decentralisation of control, integrated diagnostics, quick and easy maintenance, and low cost -are necessary. To meet these requirements, Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have emerged as a technology that combines control, communication, and computation, and offers the necessary flexibility to meet new demands in distributed and large scale systems.
Recently, security of NCSs has become a very important issue as wireless communication networks might serve as new access points for adversaries trying to disrupt the system dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on control systems have caused substantial damage to a number of physical processes. One of the most well-known examples is the attack on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia that happened in January 2000. The attacker hacked into the controllers that activate and deactivate valves and caused flooding of the grounds of a hotel, a park, and a river with a million liters of sewage. Another incident is the very recent SuxNet virus that targeted Siemens' supervisory control and data acquisition systems which are used in many industrial processes. These incidents show that strategic mechanisms to identify and deal with attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1] - [19] , a range of topics related to security of control systems have been discussed. In general, they provide analysis tools for quantifying the performance degradation induced by different classes of attacks and propose reaction strategies to counter their effect on the system dynamics. Most of the existing work, however, has This work was supported by the Australian Research Council under the Discovery Project DP170104099.
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tianciy@student.unimelb.edu.au considered control systems with linear dynamics, although in most engineering applications the dynamics of the plants being monitored and controlled is highly nonlinear. There are some results addressing the nonlinear case though. In [20] , exploiting sensor redundancy, the authors address the problem of sensor attack detection and state estimation for uniformly observable continuous-time nonlinear systems. Similarly, in [21] , the problem of state estimation and attack isolation for a class of noisy discrete-time nonlinear system is considered. In particular, the authors propose an observer-based estimator, using a bank of circle-criterion observers, which provides a robust estimate of the system state in spite of sensor attacks and measurement noise, and an estimator-based isolation algorithm. In this manuscript, we address the problem of attack detection and isolation of a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems in the presence of measurement noise and sensor attacks. We assume that bounds on the measurement noise and an upper bound on the number of attacked sensors are known. We consider the setting when the system has p sensors, all of which are subject to measurement noise and up to q < p of them are attacked. We assume that q is known but the exact subset of sensors being attacked is unknown. Using a bank of the observers, each observer leading to an ISS estimation error, we propose two algorithms for detecting and isolating false data sensor attacks. These algorithms make use of the ISS property of the observers to check whether the trajectories of observers are "consistent" with the attack-free trajectories of the system. The main idea behind our algorithms is the following. Each observer in the bank is driven by a different subset of sensors. Thus, without attacks, the observers produce ISS estimation errors with respect to measurement noise only. For every pair of observers in the bank, we compute the largest difference between their estimates. If a pair of observers is driven by a subset of attack-free sensors, then the largest difference between their estimates is also ISS with respect to measurement noise only. However, if there are attacks on some of the sensors, the observers driven by those sensors might produce larger differences than the attack-free ones. These ideas work well under the assumption that less than p/2 sensors are attacked, i.e, q < p/2.
Notation.
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and R n×m the set of n × m matrices for any m, n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ R n , v J denotes the stacking of all v i , i ∈ J and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |v| = √ v ⊤ v and
We say a sequence {v(k)} ∈ l ∞ if ||v|| ∞ < ∞. We denote the cardinality of a set S as card(S). We denote a variable m uniformly distributed in the interval (a, b) as m ∼ U(a, b).
II. DETECTION AND ISOLATION OF SENSOR ATTACKS
In this section, we consider a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems subject to sensor attacks and measurement noise. This class of systems has been considered in [22] - [25] in the attack-free case. Consider the system:
with state x ∈ R n , sensor measurementỹ ∈ R p , measurement noisem ∈ R p satisfying {m(k)} ∈ l ∞ , matrices A ∈ R n×n , G ∈ R n×r , and H ∈ R r×n , and attack vector a ∈ R p . If sensor i ∈ {1, . . . , p} is not attacked, then the i-th component of a(k) satisfies a i (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0. Otherwise, sensor i is attacked and a i (k) is arbitrary and possibly unbounded. We denote W ⊆ {1, . . . , p} the set of attacked sensors and thus supp(a(k)) = W for all k ≥ 0. We assume the set W is fixed and unknown to us, and later we will assume that the number of elements of W is bounded by a known bound. The term ρ(u, y) is a known arbitrary realvalued vector that depends on the system inputs and outputs. The state-dependent nonlinearity f (Hx) is an r-dimensional vector where each entry is a function of a linear combination of the states
with H ij denotes the entries of matrix H. Let 0 < q < p 2 be the largest integer such that for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(J) ≥ p − 2q an observer of the form:
x
exists forỹ J ∈ R card(J) . Herex J ∈ R n denotes the estimate of x fromỹ J , and
are the corresponding observer matrices. The matrixC J is the stacking of allC i , i ∈ J, whereC i denotes the i-th row ofC. Define the estimation error e J (k) :
We assume the following. Assumption 1: If a J (k) = 0, there exist constants c J > 0, λ J ∈ (0, 1), and γ J ≥ 0 such that
Remark 1: In this manuscript, we consider systems of the form (1)- (2) because under certain conditions on f (·), there exist tools -based on the circle-criterion -to construct observers of the form (4) satisfying Assumption 1. In particular, we use the result in [21] , where the design method is posed as the solution of a semidefinite program.
Assumption 2: At most q sensors are attacked, i.e.,
and q > 0 is a known integer.
Assumption 3:
The bound on measurement noise is known, i.e., ||m|| ∞ =m,
andm > 0 is a known constant.
We aim at detecting and isolating sensor attacks on system (1)- (2) for attacks and noise satisfying Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, respectively, and observers of the form (4) satisfying Assumption 1.
A. Detection of sensor attacks
We construct an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for system (1)- (2), i.e., considering all sensors, and for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(J) = p − q. The obtained estimates are denoted asx andx J , respectively. Define e =x − x and let a = 0; then, under Assumption 1, there exist c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), and γ ≥ 0 such that
Let
for all k ≥ k ⋆ , wherē
However, if sensors are under attack, i.e. a = 0, then the estimatesx(k) andx J (k) in π(k) are likely to be inconsistent and thus lead to larger π(k) than the attack-free case. Definē
then,z can be used as a threshold to detect sensor attacks for k ≥ k ⋆ . However, it is still possible that for some k ≥ k ⋆ and a k = 0, inequality (9) still holds, which would result in wrong detection. Then, to improve the detection rate, we perform the detection over windows of N ∈ N time-steps. That is, for each
1: Design an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for system (1)- (2) and for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q. 
>z, then sensor attacks occurs in the i-th window, and
otherwise, sensors are attack-free in the i-th window, and detection(i) = 0.
6: Return detection(i)
Because our knowledge of ||m|| ∞ might be conservative, we consider the case when the actual bound on measurement noise is smaller thanm, e.g. ||m|| ∞ = τ ·m and τ ∈ (0, 1). We give a sufficient condition under which sensor attacks cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the ith time window for a given N > 0.
Proposition 1: Given a time window length N > 0, if
and sensor attacks cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
Proof: For a given time window length N > 0, sensor attacks cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window for a = 0, if we have
. It follows that the inequality (12) is satisfied for a satisfying (11) for all
and thus sensor attacks cannot be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
Next, we give a sufficient condition under which sensor attacks can always be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window for a given N > 0.
Proposition 2: For a given time window length N > 0, if there exist
then, π(k 1 ) >z and thus sensor attacks can be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window. Proof: For a given time window length N > 0, sensor attacks can be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window for a = 0, if there exist
Since there are at most q sensors under attack, we know there exist at least oneĪ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(Ī) = p − q such that aĪ = 0, and
which implies sensor attacks can be detected by Algorithm 1 in the i-th time window.
B. Isolation of sensor attacks
To perform the isolation, we construct an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(J) = p − q and each subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(S) = p − 2q. Hence, by Assumption 1, for a S (k) = 0, there exist c S > 0, λ S ∈ (0, 1), and γ S ≥ 0 satisfying
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0. Note that, because λ S ∈ (0, 1), there always exist k * S such that c S λ k S |e(0)| ≤ ǫ, for any ǫ > 0 and k ≥ k Since there are at most q sensors under attack, we know there exist at least oneĪ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(Ī) = p − q such that aĪ = 0 and (14) is satisfied. Define
From (14) and (16), we obtain πĪ (k) ≤ 2(ǫ + γ ′Ī ||mĪ || k ), for all k ≥k * , where
However, if the subset J of sensors is under attack, i.e., a J = 0, thenx J (k) andx S (k) in π J (k) are more inconsistent and might produce larger π J (k). Definē
for each J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q, where
then,z J can be used as a threshold to isolate attacked sensors. For all k ≥k * , we select out all the subsets J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q that satisfy
Denote asW (k) the set of sensors that we regard as attackfree at time k. Then,W (k) is given as the union of all subsets J such that (20) holds:
Thus, the set {1, . . . , p} \W (k) is isolated as the set of attacked sensors at time k. However, note that it is still possible that for some k ≥k * and some J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q, a J (k) = 0 but (20) still holds. This implies that J ⊂W (k) even if a J = 0 and would result in wrong isolation. Therefore, we perform the isolation over windows of N ∈ N time-steps. That is, for each
we compute and collect W (k) for every k in the window and select the subset J with card(J) ≥ p − q that is equal toW (k) most often in the i-th window. We denote this J as J(i). Then, we select {1, . . . , p} \ J(i) as the set of sensors under attack in the i-th window. This is formally stated in Algorithm 2.
Next, we give a sufficient condition under which none of the attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window for a given N > 0 when ||m|| ∞ = τ ·m where τ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 3: Given a time window length N > 0, if
then, for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and
Algorithm 2 Attack Isolation. 1: Design an observer satisfying Assumption 1 for each subset J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and each subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(S) = p − 2q . 2: Intialize the counter variable n J (i) = 0 for all J with card(J) ≥ p − q and all i ∈ Z >0 . 3: Calculatez J for each J with card(J) = p − q as (19) . 4: For i ∈ Z >0 and ∀k ∈ k * + (i − 1)N,k * + iN − 1 , calculate π J (k), ∀J with card(J) = p − q as follows:
5: For all k ∈ k * + (i − 1)N,k * + iN − 1 , take the union of all the subsets J such that π J (k) ≤z J :
7: For all i ∈ Z >0 , select the subset J with card(J) ≥ p − q that is equal toW (k) most often, i.e.,
8: For all i ∈ Z >0 , the set of sensors potentially under attack is given as:
9: For all i ∈ Z >0 , returnÃ(i).
and none of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window. Proof: For given time window length N > 0, none of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th window if ∀J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and a J = 0, we have
If (22) holds, then π J (k) ≤z J for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and all k ∈ k * + (i − 1)N,k * + iN − 1 . Then, none of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window.
Proposition 4: Given a time window length N > 0, if for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and a J = 0, we have
for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, then for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and a J = 0, we have π J (k) >z J for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, and all of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window. Proof: Given a time window length N > 0, all of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window if ∀J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and a J = 0, we have π J (k) >z J for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window. Since there are at most q sensors under attack, for each subset J with card(J) = p − q we know there exist at least oneS ⊂ J with card(S) = p − 2q such that aS = 0, and |eS| ≤ ǫ + γS||mS|| k , for all k ∈ k * + (i − 1)N,k * + iN − 1 . By construction of (17), it is satisfied that
for all k ≥k * . If (23) holds at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, then from triangle inequality, for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and a J = 0, we have
for at least N/2 time-steps in the i-th time window, which implies all of attacked sensors can be isolated by Algorithm 2 in the i-th time window. Remark 2: By following the evolution of Algorithm 2, wrong isolation can be largely avoided. Moreover, the performance of Algorithm 2 can be further increased by increasing the length of the time window, which is reflected in Example 1.
Example 1 Consider the discrete-time nonlinear system subject to measurement noise and sensor attacks:
with δ = 0.1, α = 1, andm ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5). Using the design method proposed in [21] , we find circle-criterion observers of the form (4) satisfying Assumption 1 exist for each subset J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) ≥ 1. Since p = 4, by Assumption 2, the maximum number of attacks is q = 1. We design a circle-criterion observer for the whole system and for each J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) = 3 and each S ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(S) = 2. Therefore, in total, 4 3 + 4 2 + 1 = 11 observers are designed. We obtain their ISS gains by montecarlo simulations. Theses 11 observers are initialized atx(0) = x(0) and x(0) is randomly selected from a standard normal distribution so we choose ǫ = 0. We let N = 50, 100, 200. We follow the evolutions of both algorithms for 1000 time-steps. For Algorithm 1, we let W = {2}, which means the 2nd sensor is under attack. We let a 2 ∼ U(−a, a) and a = 0.7, 1. We run Algorithm 1 with 
III. CONCLUSION
We propose two algorithms for detecting and isolating sensor attacks respectively for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems subject to measurement noise and sensor attacks when we know the bound on measurement noise and the upper bound on the number of attacked sensors.
